Acting intuition into sense:
How film crews make sense with embodied ways of knowing

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Abstract

This study contributes to a holistic understanding of sensemaking by going beyond the mind–body dualism. To do so, we focus analytically on a phenomenon that operates at the nexus of mind and body: intuition. By observing four film crews, we unpack how people act their intuition into sense—that is, how they transform, through action, an initial sense (intuition) that is tacit, intimate, and complex into one that is publicly displayed, simpler, and ordered (i.e., a developed sense). Our model identifies two sensemaking trajectories, each of which involves several bodily actions (e.g., displaying feelings, working hands-on, speaking assertively). These actions enable intuition to express a facet of itself and acquire new properties. This study makes three important contributions. First, it develops the holistic-relational character of sensemaking by locating it in the relations among multiple loci (cognition, language, body, and materiality) rather than in each one disjunctively. Second, it theorizes embodied sensemaking as a transformative process entailing a rich repertoire of bodily actions. Third, it extends sensemaking research by attending to the physicality and materiality of language in embodied sensemaking.

Keywords: Body, Embodied knowledge, Filmmaking, Intuition, Sensemaking

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Introduction

Ever since Weick introduced the concept of sensemaking in *The Social Psychology of Organizing* (1979), the literature has been marked by a form of logocentrism, viewing sensemaking as "a rational, intellectual process" (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012: 65; Introna, 2018). Recently, some scholars have argued that such a focus eclipses other ways in which meanings are constructed (e.g., through affect and feelings) and risks impoverished theorizing about how sensemaking takes place (Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010; Maitlis et al., 2013). In particular, by perpetuating mind–body dualism, and neglecting the deep roots of mind in corporeal experience (Varela et al., 1991), it prevents us from developing a more holistic and relational account of sensemaking (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015).

So far, the few scholars who have taken a more holistic view of sensemaking have focused on the body. Their work provides rich descriptions of how the feeling body is implicated in sensemaking—for instance, by investigating how people make sense not only through cognitive information-processing, but also through feelings and bodily senses (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012; de Rond et al. 2019; Hindmarsh and Pilnick, 2007; Yakhlef and Essen, 2013). Accordingly, these works have enriched research by shifting the locus of sensemaking from the mind to the body.

In this paper, we offer a complementary perspective on holistic sensemaking that can help overcome unnecessary dualisms (Tsoukas, 2017). Instead of focusing on any one locus in particular, we focus analytically on a phenomenon that inherently involves body and mind *together*: intuition (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Petitmengin, 1999; Sadler-Smith, 2016; Varela and Shear, 1999). Intuition is a rapid, non-sequential, and nonconscious information processing mode that comprises both cognitive and affective elements, and which results in an affectively charged judgement (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). It provides an initial sense (an unexplainable feeling that can be confusing; Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009; Dane and Pratt, 2007) that requires further sensemaking (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012). Accordingly, we ask: How do people act their intuition into sense[1]? In other words, we study how people turn an initial sense (intuition) that is tacit, intimate, and complex into one that is publicly displayed, simpler, and ordered (i.e., developed sense) (Weick et al., 2005: 413).

Inspired by a holistic-relational ontology (e.g., Kuhn et al., 2017), we study how film crews act their intuition into sense when dealing with shooting and editing. Our study identifies two sensemaking trajectories, and explains how three bodily actions—displaying feelings, working hands-on, and speaking assertively—enable intuition to express a facet of itself (affect, expertise, and confidence, respectively) and acquire new properties (detectability, solidity, and authority and commitment, respectively).

Our study makes three contributions. First, we develop the holistic-relational character of sensemaking, by locating sensemaking in the relations between multiple loci rather than in each of them disjunctively. Second, by exploring how people make sense with their intuition, we theorize embodied sensemaking as a transformative process that entails a rich repertoire of bodily actions—i.e., not just a feeling body, but also one that thinks, speaks, acts, and so on. Third, we extend past research by attending to the physicality and materiality of language in embodied sensemaking.

The paper is organized as follows. We first explain how sensemaking scholarship perpetuates the mind–body dualism, and how focusing on a phenomenon that involves body and mind together—intuition—can help go beyond this heritage. We then account for our methodology, and subsequently show how film workers act their intuition into sense. Finally, we conclude our paper with a discussion of how our study contributes to sensemaking scholarship and opens new avenues for research.

Beyond the heritage of mind–body dualism in the sensemaking literature

For many years, sensemaking scholars have accepted the duality between mind and body (de Rond et al., 2019; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015). From this metaphysical stance, mind and body are distinct and separable, and such phenomena as language and problem-solving are assumed to be located in the mind. This broadly accepted perspective has led scholars to consider sensemaking primarily as a process that takes place within the mind, through cognition and language (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012; Introna, 2018). Weick's early studies, for instance, feature sensemaking as an information-processing activity located in the mind: people extract cues from the continuous flow of activities or events into which they are thrown, and match them with mental schemes resulting from past experiences (Weick, 1988, 1995). These mental schemes, which may include data that remain nonconscious (Hill and Levenhagen, 1995; Polanyi, 1966), directly influence how people make sense of environmental cues (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). The more varied

people's mental schemes and experiences, the better they can detect relevant cues in the environment, and so act adequately (Weick, 1988, 1995).

Since the 2000s, this social-cognitivist account of sensemaking has been complemented by a constructivist-discursive orientation. This stream argues that sensemaking also occurs through "language, talk and communication" (Weick et al., 2005: 409). From this perspective, people organize thoughts and actions, and arrange confusing cues into more coherent interpretations of what is going on, through narratives such as stories, accounts, and reports (Boudès and Laroche, 2009; Brown and Humphreys, 2003; Patriotta, 2003; Taylor and Van Every, 2000; Weick, 2009). Metaphors also play a part, but their power resides more in their ability to connect cues and frames (Gioia et al., 1994; Hill and Levenhagen, 1995), to impart order and familiarity to novel situations, and to provide justifications for actions (Cornelissen, 2012; Cornelissen et al., 2008).

Recently, sensemaking research has been criticized for having a rather cold and rationalistic view of how humans construct meaning. Weick (2010), for instance, describes his own analysis of the Bhopal disaster as "cool and cognitive" (p. 537). In response, some scholars have called for novel theories that approach sensemaking as more embodied and holistic (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015). For these scholars, mind–body dualism prevents us from investigating the role of the body and affect in sensemaking (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012; Hindmarsh and Pilnick, 2007; Maitlis et al., 2013), even though these phenomena are a significant part of organizational life. In this view, the fact that we have bodies—or rather, that we *are* bodies, in a more phenomenological ontology (Merleau-Ponty, 1945)—is consequential for sensemaking. While this perspective remains nascent, a few important papers have taken up the challenge of developing a more holistic account of sensemaking. So far, these attempts have primarily consisted in attending to the (feeling) body as another locus of sensemaking.

In their research on a documentary about the British and Irish Lions rugby tour, Cunliffe and Coupland (2012) draw a contrast with traditional perspectives that locate sensemaking in the mind. Relying on a phenomenological ontology, they argue that professionals make sense of themselves and their lives through lived and felt bodily sensations, and sensory knowing. Thus, we do not necessarily *understand* meanings; instead, "we *sense* meanings" (p. 69)—that is, we implicitly comprehend significance through an "informed feeling in [the] body" (p. 77). In the same vein, Yakhlef and Essén (2013) show that care workers know what needs to be done, based on how their body and perceptual skills (such as smelling, feeling, and moving) perceive a

situation. Their work emphasizes the crucial role of experiencing and feeling situations in the construction of meaning. De Rond, Holeman, and Howard-Granville (2019) offer another attempt to provide a more holistic account of sensemaking. They show that sensemaking relies on cues provided first and foremost by the "sensate body" (i.e., the body's ability to feel its surroundings; p. 1970). Building on Wacquant's (2015) carnal sociology, which puts the emphasis on people's experiences as beings of flesh and blood, the authors also account for the role of multiple corporeal experiences such as physical injuries, fear, anxiety, pain, and intimacy.

By showing that embodied sensemaking relies on bodily senses and feelings, these studies pave the way for a more holistic account that includes the body as another locus of sensemaking. Yet, an exclusive focus on the "feeling body"—at the expense of a body that thinks, speaks, acts, and remembers—risks missing some important aspects of sensemaking (de Rond et al., 2019), since feeling is merely an initial sense that provides an impetus for further sensemaking (Coupland and Cunliffe, 2012: 82). Crucially, in their attempt to distance themselves from both the cognitive-discursive tradition and the neurophysiological view of embodied cognition, these authors have somehow excluded the mind from the picture—so much so that the bodies we are presented with seem mindless (and disembrained). Hence, ironically, these works might reinforce the ontological split between body and mind that they aspire to overcome (Gärtner, 2013).

Mindful of these difficulties, we comprehend the holistic character of sensemaking from an alternative perspective. Since approaching sensemaking from any of its loci—body, language, cognition—might end up reifying these loci as standalone entities, it may be more fruitful to start with a phenomenon that spans mind and body from the outset. As we explain below, one such phenomenon is intuition.

Intuition: at the nexus of mind and body

While the concept of intuition has long been poorly defined (Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012), more robust definitions have emerged over the last 15 years. Dane and Pratt (2007), for instance, define intuition as an "affectively charged judgment that arises through rapid, non-conscious and holistic associations" (p. 33). For Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005), intuition is a "non-sequential information-processing mode, which comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any use of conscious reasoning" (p. 353). Overall, these definitions highlight precisely what makes intuition unique: it operates at the nexus of mind and body (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Sadler-Smith, 2016).

The growing consensus among cognitive scientists and organization scholars alike is that intuition arises from a rapid, non-conscious, and non-sequential process of pattern-matching between environmental stimuli and mental schemes stored in long-term memory (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011; Kahneman, 2003). People develop complex domain-relevant mental schemes through explicit and implicit learning within a particular domain of expertise (Burke and Miller, 1999; Dane and Pratt, 2007; Klein 2003; Sadler-Smith, 2008). Thus, expertise is central to intuition (Salas et al., 2010; Weick, 1995). For Simon, for instance, intuition is all the more effective when individuals have acquired expertise in a specific domain (Simon, 1983, 1987; Simon and Chase, 1973). In a similar vein, Klein's work shows that intuition is "an expression of experience as people build up patterns that enable them to rapidly size up situations and make rapid decisions without having to compare options" (Klein, 2015: 164; Klein, 2007, 2011; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Klein et al., 1986; Klein et al., 2007). Klein (2015) also points to the essentially tacit nature of intuition—often unavailable to consciousness and difficult to put into words, echoing Polanyi's aphorism that "we can know more than we can tell" (Polanyi, 1966: 4).

Another important finding is that intuition is associated to the body in multiple ways. First, the process by which intuition is constructed is emotionally driven and mediated by feelings from past experience (e.g., Epstein, 1994). The work of neuroscientist Damasio supports this view by showing the role of affectively encoded memories (i.e., somatic markers) in decision-making (Bechara et al., 1997; Damasio, 1994, 1999). These somatic markers, which support decision-making and operate in advance of conscious awareness, suggest that "the body may know" before we consciously know (Dane and Pratt, 2007: 47). Second, research shows that intuition is an affectively charged judgment in that it includes feelings, emotions, and bodily sensations (Dane and Pratt, 2007: 38). When expressing their intuition, people often rely on bodily metaphors—e.g., "gut feeling" (Hayashi, 2001), "feeling in our marrow" (Barnard, 1938: 306), "weird feeling in [the] stomach" (Sadler-Smith, 2016: 1077). More broadly, they also tend to use a vocabulary related to feelings and corporeal senses (Sadler-Smith, 2016). For Sadler-Smith (2016), all these verbal expressions indicate that intuitions may emerge into consciousness as "bodily awareness." In that respect, he encourages scholars to locate the felt sense of intuition in the body by means of body mapping.

Finally, other scholars, with a post-cognitivist and enactivist orientation, have pointed to intuition as an embodied way of knowing (Petitmengin, 1999; Varela and Shear, 1999)—that is, a

tacit kind of knowing that is inscribed in our bodies and that we draw on in use, but find it hard to be consciously aware of, or put into words (Hadjimichael and Tsoukas, 2019; Harquail and King, 2010; Petitmengin, 2001). Dreyfus and Dreyfus' (2005) model of skill acquisition shows for instance that as people develop more experience through extensive practice, and attain the status of experts, they get better at intuitively knowing what to do—i.e., acting without conscious thought, recourse to rules, or the ability to explain. Most importantly, progress towards expertise and intuition can only be made if experience is assimilated and sedimented in an "embodied, atheoretical way" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005: 786). Intuition therefore captures embodied past experiences and is inscribed in bodily skills (Dreyfus, 2017).

To sum up, while we do need more research on intuition, there is a clear consensus about its cognitive and bodily character (Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Sadler-Smith, 2016). It is also accepted that intuition is linked to expertise, and tacit and embodied ways of knowing more generally. These features make intuition a most pertinent phenomenon to examine in order to develop a more holistic perspective on sensemaking by overcoming mind–body dualism.

Methods

Field research and data collection

Film crews on set. Filmmaking involves the creation of a temporary organization composed of specialized workers. This setting offers important opportunities for learning in the context of this study, as it is characterized by uncertainty, time pressure, and many unexpected events (Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011)—three characteristics known to prompt intuitive processing (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hayashi, 2001).

Data source. Our data is part of a three-year research project on intuition and sensemaking in filmmaking, during which the first author spent a great deal of time observing film workers working on the film set, and chatting informally with them. This allowed her to become familiar with the way they share their ideas and experiences, as well as to understand what their work involves and how they work together.

The data for this study comprises observations (circa 125 hours) of four crews working on four films: *Small Head* (32 hours of observation, film shooting), *The Evil Clone* (34 hours, film shooting), *The Game* (35 hours, film shooting), and *Summer* (24 hours, editing) (see Table A1 in

appendix for details on each film). The first author also conducted informal interviews with the film workers, mostly after the day's shooting, in order to complement her observations.

Field notes. During data collection, the first author kept an in situ field journal summarizing key features of the situation, and film workers' interactions and behaviors (e.g., standing, moving, speaking). She also kept a more narrative retrospective field journal that comprised reflexive thoughts written after leaving the set or the next day. Importantly, she took notes about every moment identified as being related to intuition, using a specific protocol, as we explain below.

Preliminary identification of potential intuitions in flight. Capturing intuition "in flight" is difficult (Sinclair, 2011, 2014), and the few observation-based studies on intuition make no mention of how the observers captured it (e.g., Coget et al., 2009; Huang and Pearce, 2015). Our data collection protocol was designed to help with this challenge. On the basis of existing literature, the first author built a repertoire of semantic and behavioral descriptors of intuition, using four of its major outward characteristics: affective charge, feeling of certainty and confidence, quick judgment, and inability to explain (Dane and Pratt, 2007). For instance, the use of bodily metaphors (semantic descriptor; e.g., "My stomach is in knots") or applause (behavioral descriptor) could signal an affective charge, while an interjection (e.g., semantic descriptor; "Ah! I know!") could signal a quick judgment. During the observations and informal interviews, this repertoire incorporated new descriptors emerging from the field (e.g., we added "a snap of the fingers," which could signal a quick judgment, to our list of behavioral descriptors). Table 1 offers illustrations of semantic and behavioral descriptors. In total, we identified 104 potential intuitions in flight—i.e., moments during which at least one of the four outward characteristics of intuition was present. We explain below how we refined this preliminary identification of potential intuitions.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Data analysis

Our data analysis followed a qualitative, inductive and iterative content analysis approach, inspired by Gioia et al.'s (2013) analytical principles (see also Langley and Abdallah, 2011), as

well as Kuhn et al.'s (2017) relational ontology. It also involved a reflexive approach—i.e., efforts to create an interplay between producing interpretations and challenging them, in order to consider more than one set of meanings, and avoid privileging a single favored angle (Alvesson, 2003). Overall, our data analysis proceeded in three steps, as follows.

Step 1: Sharpening our identification of intuition. We first sharpened the preliminary identifications of potential intuitions in flight (see above), in order to check whether they passed a more robust test. For each of the 104 potential intuitions identified during observation, the first author triangulated data gathered during observation with her informal interview notes. Triangulation is important since some characteristics of intuition are not accessible through observation. In particular, feelings are not always clearly displayed and interpretable, unless they are explicitly verbalized (e.g., "I have a bad feeling"). In the same vein, the inability to explain is not easily identifiable for an observer, except when it is explicitly verbalized (e.g., "I can't explain"). Accordingly, if a film worker said during an informal interview that they could explain, from the start, how they knew this was the right thing to do (e.g., "I did this because X, Y, or Z"), we considered that the intuition originally identified "in flight" should now be disqualified, since the ability to explain excludes the possibility of an intuition. Conversely, if a film worker said, e.g., "At that moment, I didn't know why I was doing that. But now, on reflection, I think it was because X or Y," the intuition identified "in flight" was retained, since the ability to produce an *ex-post* rationalization does not preclude intuition (e.g., Sonenshein, 2007).

Having triangulated the data in this way, we then decided to retain only those intuitions that could be associated with at least three of the four characteristics of intuition listed above[2]. This robust identification procedure led to a total of 78 intuitions. Table 1 above illustrates how we identified intuition in our data, by combining our in-flight preliminary identification of intuition with notes from our informal interviews.

Step 2: Identifying what happens once intuition appears. The first author immersed herself in the data in order to understand what happens when an intuition appears. The analytical process took place iteratively, with constant moving back and forth between codes and data, and with emerging ideas leading to additional empirical investigation. Finding the twist that pulls all the ideas together is also necessarily a creative act (Langley and Abdallah, 2011).

Following Gioia et al.'s (2013) recommendations, the first author systematically coded the film workers' own words and actions *following* the appearance of an intuition (first round of open

coding). These data were gradually combined and eventually grouped into 23 first-order concepts (e.g., "manipulating materials," "interjections") through multiple re-readings and constant comparison between different extracts (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). These first-order concepts were then considered from a researcher's perspective by looking at similarities and differences. For instance, first-order concepts such as "manipulating materials" (e.g., Jo is grappling with the ropes to fix the rope-and-pulley mechanism) or "moving equipment" (e.g., Wyatt is moving his camera because his lens does not offer the wide perspective the director needs) were grouped into a second-order theme labeled "using working tools to solve a problem." Similarly, first-order concepts such as "verbalizing a bad feeling" (e.g., Sally says, 'I have a bad feeling') or "verbalizing a good feeling" (e.g., Fred says, 'I have a good feeling') refer to verbal reports of feelings (second-order theme). A total of eight second-order themes were identified.

Next, we developed a higher level of theoretical translation and abstraction by connecting the second-order themes. For instance, physical reactions, vocal reactions, and verbal reports of feelings refer to the aggregate dimension "displaying feelings." Following this analytical process, we obtained three aggregate dimensions—displaying feelings, working hands-on, and speaking assertively—as reported in Figure 1, which presents our data structure (see Table A2 for more illustrations).

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Step 3: Building a model of sensemaking with intuition. In order to understand how film workers act their intuition into sense, we conducted another round of coding. We looked at each aggregate dimension in order to understand its role in sensemaking. Moving back and forth between our data and the literature (e.g., the notions of resistance tests and properties in Kuhn et al., 2017)[3], we found that each aggregate dimension is a bodily action that has a transformative power on intuition: it expresses one facet of intuition and enables intuition to acquire new properties. Displaying feelings—which comprises verbal reports of feelings, vocal reactions, and physical reactions—expresses the *affect* facet of intuition. In so doing, it makes intuition visible and audible to bystanders (e.g., they comment on it, look at the person): intuition hence acquires *detectability*. For its part, working hands-on—which involves using one's working tools with hands (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary) to solve a problem or to create—manifests the

expertise facet of intuition and thereby enables intuition to acquire *solidity* (i.e., "serious[ness] in purpose or character", Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). Finally, speaking assertively—verbally predicting, directing, and indicating—displays the *confidence* facet of intuition and thus enables intuition to acquire two new properties: *commitment* and *authority.*

Finally, as we were trying to understand how the three bodily actions (aggregate dimensions) connect in dynamic terms (Gioia et al., 2013), we identified two ways in which film workers could act their intuition into sense. A first trajectory consists in simply displaying feelings and then speaking assertively (i.e., without working hands-on). A second trajectory involves displaying feelings, speaking assertively, and working hands-on in-between. Importantly, we noted that this second trajectory was associated with resistances—we are using the definition of this word in physics, i.e., friction forces that resist a movement, an action; an impeding or stopping effect exerted by one thing on another (Oxford online dictionary). In our data, resistances mainly consisted in questioning and evaluating the reasonableness and appropriateness of one's judgment ("Are you sure…"), requesting explanations or elaborations ("Why…?"; "How…?"), openly disagreeing (e.g., "I am not satisfied"; "I disagree"), or doing the opposite without saying anything. These resistances can hinder the progression of the sensemaking process, since the meaning under construction is being tested for its reliability.

Trustworthiness. For Gioia et al. (2013), member-checking (i.e., gaining feedback from insiders on emerging interpretations) and the involvement of multiple researchers, can contribute to the trustworthiness of data analysis (see also Langley and Abdallah, 2011). Throughout data collection and data analysis, the first author shared her impressions and data with the second author, who provided feedback and discussed alternative explanations that challenged her ongoing analysis with "What if…?" questions (Cornelissen and Durand, 2012; Weick, 1989). Besides, during data analysis, the first author remained in close contact and shared ongoing analysis with Owen, the director of *The Game*, who played the role of a "knowledgeable agent" (Gioia et al., 2013: 17). Owen challenged emerging interpretations and provided input that helped clarify and enhance data interpretation. Discussions with him clarified the various language modalities used on a set (e.g., suggestions, questions, nuances), and made it clear that speaking assertively was not the usual way of talking. Finally, ongoing interpretations were also challenged by colleagues during personal discussions and data analysis workshops. Their comments greatly helped refine

our analysis. Exploring all these repertoires of subjectivities helped us enrich our research, deconstruct our prejudices and strengthen the rigor of our data analysis.

Acting intuition into sense: Two trajectories

In this findings section, we draw upon various cases from our data to illustrate the two trajectories by which film workers acted their intuition into sense. In other words, we show how they transformed, through action, an initial sense (intuition) that was tacit, intimate, and complex into a publicly displayed, simpler, ordered sense (i.e., developed sense) (Weick et al., 2005: 413). For each trajectory, we provide both examples and counter-examples. By offering counter-examples, we show, by contrast, that when film workers do not follow trajectories #1 or #2, they fail to act their intuition into sense—hence, supporting our finding that intuition is acted into sense *only* when trajectories #1 or #2 are followed. Table 2 summarizes our main findings.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Trajectory #1 (no resistance): Displaying feelings then speaking assertively

The first trajectory, displaying feelings then speaking assertively, enables film workers to act their intuition into sense when no one resists their sensemaking efforts. Since no resistance arises, film workers who followed this trajectory managed to act their intuition into sense smoothly. Below, we explain this trajectory in detail with two examples drawn from two different film crews, and report more illustrations in Table 3.

A first illustration is provided by a particular moment during the shooting of *The Evil Clone*. Unconvinced by a shot, Sally (the director) asked for changes in the extras' positions before re-shooting:

> Sally: Hmm… No… Something is bugging me, but I feel like it comes from the extras. Helen, look. I say we switch this girl with this guy, and this girl here with the girl behind, it'll be fine.
>
> Helen: OK, you there, can you get up please, and take Julia's place? And Julia, come here. Same for Jean and you over there, please. [Changes are made]
>
> Sally: Yes, great, it feels fine like that. [Pointing at the extra she moved further back] Was it because of her hair?
>
> Helen: It's too big, isn't it?
>
> Sally: I don't know. I don't have a clue.

Helen: [Raising her voice to talk to the extra] That's some hairstyle the hairdresser gave you!

As this illustration shows, Sally has an intuition (presence of a negative affective charge; quick judgment; inability to explain, she does not "have a clue") and quickly acted it into sense. She first *displayed her feeling* verbally ("Something is bugging me"), and then *spoke assertively* (directing: "Look"; indicating: "I say," "We switch this girl"; predicting: "It'll be fine"). Helen did not ask any questions or seek any explanations; nor did she disagree or suggest another solution. Sally hence acted her intuition into sense, and they changed the configuration of the extras.

A scene during the shooting of *Small Head* provides another illustration of this first trajectory. The crew was shooting a scene and Nathaniel (director) was not comfortable with the acting. He had the intuition that the dialogue needed to be changed (he looks preoccupied as soon as the actors started to play the scene; he is unable to explain). He first *displayed his feeling* by reacting physically: he was stroking his back of the neck and looking around him. He then *spoke assertively,* using the indicative: "That's not right; let's start again." The crew shot the scene several times. Nathaniel eventually asked the main actor (by indicating and directing) to change the way she was speaking: "Come back to the initial script. So no question, you say it, for example, in a more solemn way." No one resisted, Nathaniel's intuition was acted into sense, and the change was reported in the shooting script.

There were many other cases where film workers met no resistance and acted their intuition into sense by displaying their feelings, and then speaking assertively, as reported in Table 3.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

A counter-example is the case of Amelia (first assistant director), who only *displayed her feeling* and was unable to accomplish sensemaking. During the shooting of *Small Head*, Nathaniel (director) was having a long conversation with the two principal actors aimed at improving the acting of a scene. Amelia had the intuition that he should stop his quest and move on, or they would be short of time for the rest of the shooting. (During observations, an affective charge was visible; and later, in an informal interview, she revealed that she had a sudden bad feeling that she could not explain.) Amelia displayed her feeling by reacting physically (she was frowning) but did not say anything. She kept her intuition to herself and did not act her intuition into sense—

Nathaniel continued his quest for better acting. Hence, this counter-example shows that displaying feelings is not enough to act intuition into sense.

Trajectory #2 (with resistances): Displaying feelings, working hands-on, then speaking assertively

The second trajectory that enables film workers to act their intuition into sense consists in displaying feelings, working hands-on, then speaking assertively. We illustrate this trajectory with a vignette involving two film workers (Sally and Jo) trying to make sense of an incident with their intuition. While Sally did not act her intuition into sense (she only displayed her feeling); Jo, who displayed her feelings, then worked hands-on, and finally spoke assertively, acted her intuition into sense. We conclude this section by pointing to other cases in our data (Table 4) that further substantiate this trajectory.

Vignette 1: The incident of the defective curtain mechanism. On the set of *The Evil Clone*, the crew is filming a key scene. The main character—a biologist who has long been secretly working on creating her functional clone—is expected to unveil, during an academic conference, the results of her secret work: her clone. Her peers, who have no idea what to expect, are sitting in the conference room, waiting for the big red curtains to open. As the suspense supposedly reaches at its climax, the heavy red curtains open. As the audience of peers (composed of extras) discern the biologist and her clone on the stage, they are expected to exclaim: "What?" and "Oh my God!", and to produce a general babble of fear, surprise, and confusion. This scene also delivers a crucial plot twist, because the audience of peers discovers that the clone has stolen the biologist's identity, and is now impersonating her.

The curtains play a crucial narrative role. But the rope-and-pulley mechanism used to open and close them is old and rusty. It worked fine during rehearsals, but now, on the day of the shoot, it is malfunctioning. Eventually the mechanism breaks, which complicates the filming of this scene and will compromise the remainder of shooting too.

During the first shoot, these difficulties force the crew to reshoot the scene. Sally (director) asks Helen (first assistant director) if they are on time, and Helen replies that they are. One extra in the audience, Laura, notes that Sally "looks preoccupied." A moment later, Sally says aloud: "I have a bad feeling." (Later, Sally informally explained that, "At that moment, [she] felt that the curtains were going to be an issue… [She] didn't know how exactly, but [she] had the feeling that it would not be fixed quickly.") Helen does not reply directly; she is lost in her thoughts, as though

something is bothering her. Everybody on set—crew, actors, and extras—is staring at Sally, chattering and waiting for the situation to be resolved. One extra, Gilbert, comments: "I understand why this is bugging her." Sally tells Helen: "I'm afraid that the curtains will force us to shoot the scene again and again and again. [Silence] [She looks worried] What do you think?" Helen mumbles something inaudible. Helen steps forward; Sally steps backwards. Now the crew is staring at Helen. Helen tells Sally: "I am going to see what can be done." Sally replies: "[silence] Err… Are you sure? [Helen, still thoughtful, remains silent]… Ok, let's try…"

In subsequent attempts to shoot the scene, the curtains either fail to open far enough, or fail to close properly. The shoots continue and numerous attempts are made. Jo (the assistant prop/decorator) keeps testing solutions between each shoot. The film crew shoots each attempt, in case it works. Suddenly, the rope mechanism breaks. Sally sighs. Helen walks quickly towards Jo. Now everyone is staring at Jo as she busily searches for a solution. Then Jo says, enthusiastically: "Ah, look! Let's do that!" Talking to herself, she makes a sudden move towards the left-hand side of the rope mechanism. (Later, Jo told us that while she found the situation discouraging, she nonetheless had the strong feeling and conviction that she would find a solution, even if she did not yet know what it would be.) Helen is now standing next to Jo, who is handling the ropes where they broke:

> Helen: Jo, what do we do with the curtains? I just want to know if it is possible or not. If it's really not possible, you have to tell me; we don't have time.
>
> Jo: [Holding and working with the ropes where they are worn out] The rope mechanism's broken. It's an old mechanism.
>
> Helen: OK, it sounds like a real pain. So it's not possible? Is it possible or not?
>
> Jo: [Handling the ropes and moving to the left to fix the other end of the ropes] Yes, yes, don't worry, it will work.
>
> Helen: [Following her] Are you sure? How are you going to do it? What do you need to fix the problem?
>
> Jo: [Self-confidently, while quickly glancing assertively at Helen and working on the mechanism at the same time] Err, I don't know exactly… but I know it will be fixed, trust me.
>
> Helen: OK.

Analysis of Vignette 1. This first vignette portrayed two film workers—Sally and Jo—trying to make sense with their intuition, and a third—Helen—resisting their sensemaking efforts. First, we saw Sally having a sudden bad feeling that she could not explain (i.e., an intuition): the curtains will not be fixed quickly (or ever); this problem will jeopardize the rest of the shooting. She *displayed her feeling* through words ("I have a bad feeling") and physical reactions (she looks worried, remains silent), drawing comments from those nearby ("She looks preoccupied"). Obviously, she did not know what to do and asked Helen her opinion on the situation. Eventually, as Helen resisted Sally's intuition that the problem would not be fixed ("I am going to see what can be done"), we saw Sally give up on her own intuition ("OK, let's try.")

Second, we witnessed Jo acting her intuition into sense, despite Helen's resistance. As the vignette showed, even though Jo could not explain how or when it would happen, and was aware of the time constraints, she nevertheless expressed a positive feeling and felt certain that the rope mechanism would be fixed (i.e., she had an intuition). Just like Sally, we saw Jo first *displaying her feeling*: through vocal reactions (interjections: "Ah, look! Let's do that!") and physical reactions (sudden moves, speaking enthusiastically), she made her intuition visible to others. Then, she *worked hands-on* to solve the problem. Specifically, as Helen resisted Jo's intuition by asking multiple questions ("What do we do with the curtains?"; "Is it possible or not?"; "Are you sure?")—some of which were closed-ended ("So it's not possible?")—we saw Jo handling further her tools and the rope mechanism. She was cutting, rearranging and pulling the ropes, tying small knots, and watching and listening to the way the ropes flowed through the rusty pulley. In short, we can see Jo testing and refining her intuition by working hands-on, and gradually constructing a more elaborated sense.

Finally, we saw Jo (with the ropes, the pulley, and her scissors still in her hands) *speaking assertively* to Helen, who was obviously skeptical about her attempts to fix the rope mechanism. The use of the future tense here ("It will work") indicates that Jo was predicting that her intuition would work; while the use of directives ("Don't worry") is one way to ask Helen to trust her. Eventually, and in response to Helen's open-ended questions ("How are you going to do it?")—suggesting that she now believed that a solution was possible—Jo continued asserting that she would fix the problem (with predictions such as "I know it will be fixed," and directives such as "Trust me"), while continuing to work on the rope-and-pulley mechanism. Helen asked no further questions (i.e., she stopped resisting). Jo acted her intuition into sense, and fixed the problem.

To sum up, our analysis of this vignette suggests that acting an intuition into sense when resistances arise requires people to successively *display feelings*, then *work hands-on*, and eventually *speak assertively*—as Jo did. The counter-example of Sally, who, in contrast to Jo, did not act her intuition into sense—she only *displayed her feeling*—further supports our finding: when there are resistances, the full trajectory—displaying feelings, working hands-on, and speaking assertively—is needed to act intuition into sense.

Additional evidence from our observations. The illustrations in Table 4 corroborate this trajectory by featuring several cases where film workers acted their intuition into sense by successively *displaying feelings*, then *working hands-on*, and finally *speaking assertively*.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Counter-examples of trajectory #2 (with resistances)

In this section, we provide counter-examples of trajectory #2, i.e., we focus on cases where film workers, in the presence of resistances, followed alternative paths that did not enable them to act their intuition into sense. We start with a long vignette that features two film workers who have been unable to act their intuition into sense.

Vignette 2: Two film workers do not act their intuition into sense. Several weeks before the shooting of *The Game*, Owen (director), Wyatt (director of photography), and Cassie (script supervisor and first assistant director) go to the location of the upcoming shoot to do preparatory work. As they discuss how to film a scene set in a marketplace, Owen spontaneously tells Wyatt what kind of field of view and camera angle he wants: "I would like a wide shot of the market." (Later, Owen said, in an informal discussion, that he had the feeling that this was exactly what was needed since the day he wrote the scenario.) Wyatt immediately answers: "I will need more distance to do this. Technically, I'm not feeling it. I won't be able to do it; it's not possible. I will need to climb something; it's dangerous." Wyatt says this even though he does not have his camera, his camera pedestal, or the scene set up. (Later, during an informal interview, Wyatt told us that he "*knew* [emphasis] it could be dangerous or not feasible"; he had "a feeling" about it.) Owen replies: "No, we will shoot this way; we will shoot this way." Wyatt agrees, Owen's instruction is reported on the shooting script, and they proceed. This disagreement is not raised again, and the shooting takes place without any major disagreements.

The day before the shooting of the market scene, however, the disagreement emerges again. Owen isolates himself in order to back up the rushes on his computer after a day of shooting. Meanwhile, the crew is setting up the set of the market scene. Wyatt checks with Cassie where to place his camera and lights according to the shooting script. However, he does not put them where Owen wanted: his chosen spot only enables a medium shot (i.e., tighter/closer than what Owen wanted). Owen, returning from his backup, arrives on the set to check the installation. Wyatt asks Owen to approve the camera angle: "Can you approve this? Come behind the camera, see the result on the screen." Owen does so, and approves the shot, while Wyatt does not say a word. (During an informal interview, Owen said that even though he had approved the camera angle, "[his] unconscious was still telling [him], 'Oh my! This is not what you want.'" He also said that he was too tired to fight for his intuition—particularly since Wyatt was a successful and experienced director of photography.)

However, at 3am, Owen wakes up, preoccupied. He rouses his wife, who is also working on this shoot. (Owen later narrated this moment thus: "If it wakes me up in the middle of the night, it means there is something wrong. I had this strange feeling, I was thinking: 'Damn it, the field of view is not what I want. I'm going to be frustrated.'") He sends a text message to the whole crew at 5am, saying: "Hi everyone, we need to be on the set early enough to be able to change the shot, because I'm not satisfied with it. That's how it's going to be. It's non-negotiable." In the morning, on the set, Owen has a quick chat with Wyatt. He tells him: "Wyatt, I'm not satisfied with the field of view. I understand this is what you feel is right, but my feeling is different. I'm not feeling it; it woke me up in the middle of the night; we need to make a change." In response, Wyatt moves his camera to show Owen that a wide angle is difficult to achieve, because the size of the set would require a different camera lens that he has not brought with him. Finally, they reach a compromise between Owen's angle and Wyatt's angle.

Analysis of Vignette 2. In this vignette, we narrated how two film workers—Owen and Wyatt—did not manage to act their intuition into sense. While Owen had the intuition that a wide angle was needed (spontaneous response; he reported having a feeling that he could not explain; he had the conviction that he was right); Wyatt had a different intuition (he had an immediate reaction, expressed his bad feeling, and was sure of his judgment): he felt that this wide-angle shot would put him in a dangerous shooting position.

We saw Wyatt, during the preparatory work, *displaying his feeling* verbally ("I'm not feeling it") and *speaking assertively*, by indicating ("It's not possible"; "It's dangerous") and predicting the future ("I will need more distance . . . I won't be able to do it . . . I will need to climb something"). In so doing, he resisted Owen's intuition, but he did not push any further when Owen, in turn, pushed back ("No, we will shoot this way"). Wyatt's intuition eventually returned on the day before the market scene. On that day, Wyatt *worked hands-on* (by setting up his camera), but Owen did not see him using his equipment—he only saw the results, and approved Wyatt's proposal.

As the vignette showed, Owen also had an intuition. During preparatory work, he *spoke assertively* by being verbally predictive ("No, we will shoot this way"). Then, the night before the shooting of the market scene, he *displayed his feeling* in various ways—including physical reactions (he could not sleep) and verbal reports of feelings (he told his wife he was feeling bad)—, but when Wyatt, the resistant person, was absent. He then *spoke assertively*, by writing a text message to his team, in which he was predicting ("That's how it's going to be") and indicating ("I am not satisfied", "It's non-negotiable"). In the morning, on the set, Owen *spoke assertively* to Wyatt, by indicating ("I'm not satisfied", "we need to make a change"), then *displayed his feeling* again, this time to Wyatt and the crew ("I'm not feeling it", "It woke me up in the middle of the night"). However, in the end, Owen and Wyatt both gave up on their intuition, and found a compromise instead.

To sum up, in this vignette, neither Owen nor Wyatt acted their intuition into sense, and neither followed trajectory #2. Owen spoke assertively three times, and also displayed his feelings twice (once in Wyatt's absence), but he did not work hands-on. Wyatt, for his part, displayed his feelings, then spoke assertively, and eventually worked hands-on by setting up his camera but he did so in Owen's absence. Our analysis of this vignette thus suggests that when there are resistances, film workers who do not follow trajectory #2 are unable to act their intuition into sense. Table 5 provides additional counter-examples from our data that confirm the need for trajectory #2 (displaying feelings, working hands-on, then speaking assertively) to act intuition into sense when resistances arise.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Acting intuition into sense: Acquiring properties

Thus far, we have shown that film workers act their intuition into sense in two ways. When no resistance arises, they act their intuition into sense by successively displaying feelings, and then speaking assertively. When resistances arise, film workers who manage to act their intuition into sense also work hands-on (in between displaying feelings and speaking assertively). In this section, we unpack the transformative power of displaying feelings, working hands-on, and speaking assertively. We show that each of these bodily actions expresses a specific facet of intuition, and enables intuition to acquire new properties.

Displaying feelings: Manifesting the affect facet of intuition to acquire detectability

When people display their feelings (through verbal reports of feelings, vocal reactions, and physical reactions), they express the affect facet of intuition, which enables intuition to acquire detectability. In other words, intuition becomes audible and visible (instead of invisible) and is brought to the awareness of others. For instance, in Vignette 1, we saw Sally displaying her feeling verbally and physically. By expressing the affect facet of intuition, she made it *detectable* by the extras, some of whom noted that "She looks very preoccupied" (Laura) (see also Gilbert: "I understand why it's bugging her"). As a counter-example, Owen's intuition long remained in the intimacy of his mind and body, before being made detectable to others (to his wife first, and then to Wyatt and the whole crew; see Vignette 2).

Working hands-on: Manifesting the expertise facet of intuition to acquire solidity

When people work hands-on by using and handling their equipment, they express the expertise facet of intuition. That enables their intuition to acquire solidity, and to become reliable and trustworthy. Film crews' specific technical expertise is demonstrated when their hands come into contact with their working tools. This relation becomes the locus of existence of their expertise. For instance, both Jo and Wyatt master their respective materials, understand them in minute detail, and speak their language. Materials enable them to discover what they think and feel by touching and testing, and by observing what is being done through their actions. Working hands-on therefore signals that the intuition is driven not by a mere feeling, or by chance, but by skill and years of experience. It is expertise speaking. Hence, by working hands-on, intuition acquires solidity, i.e., a "serious[ness] in purpose or character" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). Such a property is important, because film workers might not approve or support a judgment based exclusively on feeling.

The counter-example of Wyatt (Vignette 2) confirms this idea: during preparatory work, he displayed his feelings and spoke assertively, but was unable to work hands-on by handling his camera, since he did not have it with him. As a result, he did not express the expertise facet of his intuition, and therefore did not signal that his judgment was based on more than a mere feeling. As a consequence, his intuition did not overcome Owen's resistance ("No, we will shoot this way"), and therefore was not acted into sense. (For other cases without working hands-on, see e.g., Owen in Vignette 2; Sally in Vignette 1; and Badis, Amelia, and Wyatt in Table 2.)

The case of Wyatt in Vignette 2 also suggests that working hands-on needs to be public in order to have a transformative power over intuition. The day before the shooting, Wyatt positioned his camera according to his intuition (working hands-on). However, he did so in the absence of Owen, and therefore did not express the expertise facet of his intuition to Owen. He did not render visible the fact that he was driven by experience. As a result, his intuition did not pass Owen's resistance, and therefore was not acted into sense. Generally, our data suggest that it is not just working hands-on that needs to be public. Displaying feelings and speaking assertively also need to be public in order to acquire their transformative power over intuition, since a core function of these bodily actions is to manifest the invisible facets of intuition.

To summarize, when resistances arise and jeopardize the sensemaking process, working hands-on enables film workers to overcome these resistances by signaling expertise, which makes the sense being constructed solid and reliable.

Speaking assertively: Manifesting the confidence facet of intuition to acquire authority and commitment

When someone speaks assertively by predicting the future, directing, or indicating—instead of hesitating, being paralyzed, or seeking advice—they manifest the confidence facet of intuition. As a result, intuition acquires two properties: authority and commitment. These properties help people to express their intuition more forcefully.

The confidence facet signals that the film workers trust their intuition, they know what they are doing, and there is no hesitation. They commit to developing their intuition into sense. Indicating shows a reality; a statement of fact; something unchangeable; something that simply *is*. Directing conveys an order to which the addressee must submit, even if the order is informal (for example, one does not say, "I order you to trust me," but simply, "Trust me") (Searle, 1969). The role of directives, whatever their intensity (e.g., ordering: "Trust me," or requesting: "Could you

trust me?"), is to make the addressee perform an action (Searle, 1969). Predicting allows speakers to turn their words into deeds (Searle, 1969). When Jo (Vignette 1) says, "It will work," she is implying, "I will make it work"; that is, she predicts what she will accomplish. By her words, she commits herself to doing it. As a counter-example, in the same vignette, Sally did not speak assertively. Instead she hesitated, stayed silent, and sought advice. Hence, she did not show confidence in her intuition—perhaps because she trusted Helen's expert judgment more than her own.

The confidence facet also reflects film workers' belief in their capacity to accomplish their intuition, and enables intuition to acquire a new property: authority. By speaking assertively, they show that an act of influence or guidance is at work and perceived to be "right." When film workers speak assertively, they are positioning themselves as the people who are implicitly authorized to speak. Conversely, the agreement, silence, or lack of questioning of the rest of the crew reaffirms their positioning. For Benoit-Barné and Cooren (2009), all these elements can be seen as the accomplishment of authority. Taylor and Van Every (2000) also remind us that the words "author" and "authority" have the same Latin root (*auctor*), and highlight that accomplishing authority involves a kind of authoring—i.e., making a difference; be(com)ing the "author" of the action; saying how the story will, or should, unfold. For instance, when Jo speaks assertively (e.g., "Trust me"; "It will work") and shows the confidence facet of her intuition, she is not creating a plausible or rational account, but an *authoritative* one. In this respect, one characteristic of authority is that it does not need to convince or persuade. Authority assumes the right to act, without any explanation. It is not about being correct, solid, or reliable; it is about who will write the story of the future.

Discussion

Our model explains how people act their intuition into sense and theorizes the transformative power of embodied sensemaking. As Figure 2 shows, acting intuition into sense can occur in two ways depending on the presence (or absence) of resistances. When sensemaking efforts do not meet any resistance, two phases are necessary to accomplish sensemaking: displaying feelings, then speaking assertively. When resistances do arise, an intermediary phase is needed: people have to perform an additional bodily action—working hands-on—in order to act their intuition into sense. Discourse, cognition, body, and materiality are each involved in each sensemaking phase,

with greater or lesser emphasis. For instance, speaking assertively mainly combines discourse (words) and body (voice).

Our model also explains how each phase enables intuition to acquire new properties by manifesting specific facets of itself. In so doing, our model unveils the transformative mechanisms that enable people to transform an initial sense (here: an intuition) into a developed sense. By displaying their feelings, people manifest the affect facet of their intuition, and make it detectable to others. Working hands-on, for its part, manifests the expertise facet of intuition and enables it to acquire solidity. Finally, by speaking assertively, people express the confidence facet of intuition, which enables their intuition to acquire authority and commitment.

INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Developing the holistic-relational character of sensemaking

Sensemaking scholars have long been concerned by the locus of sensemaking (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014): as located in the mind of individuals, as occurring through discourse and, more recently, as involving materiality or the body. Studies, however, have often attended to these loci separately. In Whiteman and Cooper's (2011) rich ethnographic tale from subarctic Canada, many sensemaking sources (e.g., feelings, bodily experience, discourse) are discernible. Yet, the article focuses on the ecological environment (e.g., landscape, black ice). Similarly, while Stigliani and Ravasi (2012) set out to explore the interplay between conversational practices and artifacts in the transition from individual to group-level sensemaking, they acknowledge that their study focuses primarily on materiality (p. 1240).

Against this background, some authors have invited scholars to combine various loci and sources of sensemaking *conjunctively* rather than in isolation, to produce an "integrative picture" (Cornelissen et al., 2014; p. 729; see also Tsoukas, 2017). Importantly, they have also invited scholars to grasp sensemaking more comprehensively through a deeper exploration of the ontology of sensemaking (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2020). Our focus on a phenomenon that operates at the nexus between the mind and the body (intuition), and our methodological approach rooted in a relational ontology (Kuhn et al., 2017), allows us to show how meanings emerge from *relations* between loci of sensemaking (e.g., bodies, materiality, discourse) rather than from each

of them separately. Our model hence suggests that accomplishing sensemaking requires a relational whole made of corporeality, cognition, materiality, and speech. Each strand of this relational bundle plays a key and timely role in the sensemaking process and needs to be combined together for sensemaking to be accomplished.

In order to study the relations among various loci of sensemaking, we uphold the boundaries between them, yet also blur them: displaying feelings mainly combines body (bodily senses, feelings, gestures, voice) and discourse (verbal reports of feelings); working hands-on bundles up body (e.g., hands and bodily senses) and artifacts (e.g., working tools); and speaking assertively is a fusion between discourse (e.g., use of the imperative mode, predictions) and body (voice). Hence, by focusing on the relations among various loci of sensemaking and, then, by initially proceeding, for analytical purposes, on the basis of a separation among these loci, we have been able to demonstrate the fragility of such separations. However, separating, segmenting, and stabilizing constituted a necessary methodological step to account in detail for the complexity and richness of the interaction or combined involvement of bodies, cognition, materiality, and discourse in sensemaking processes (Langley and Tsoukas, 2017).

Future research could pursue this conjunctive analysis one step further by adopting more radical relational ontologies, such as Barad's (2003) agential realism, which shatters separations among entities, and theorizes the entanglement of matter and meaning (Hultin and Mähring, 2017). Another approach would be Merleau-Ponty's (1945) phenomenological view, which calls for a *total unity* of mind, body, discourse, and surrounding world, transcending dualities such as interiority–exteriority, mind–body, and object–subject. In other words, there is a co-constitutive relationship between self and the world ("being-in-the-world," Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Such radical relational ontologies could help scholars explore the holistic and relational nature of sensemaking—yet they come with evident methodological challenges. As Langley and Tsoukas (2017) argue, "Pinning down the world methodologically in order to describe and make sense of it almost always involves the violation of certain strong-process ontological principles, since research that refuses to pin anything down can be limited in its intelligibility" (p. 13).

Theorizing further embodied sensemaking: what body and what sense?

By theorizing how people act their intuition into sense, this study informs embodied sensemaking research in two ways. First, we answer a core question that is too often downplayed by organizational scholars interested in the body, namely: "What is 'the body' that we assume to be

the subject of our investigation?" (Gherardi et al., 2013: 334). So far, embodied accounts of sensemaking have mainly highlighted bodily sensations, felt experiences, feelings, and perceptual skills (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012; Yakhlef and Essen, 2013). In so doing, they have studied the beginning of the embodied sensemaking process—i.e., sensations and feelings are initial senses that require further sensemaking (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012).

In this paper, we go beyond the "truism that sensemaking takes sensory input into account" (de Rond et al., 2019: p. 5), by offering a model of embodied sensemaking that accounts for a rich repertoire of bodily actions and theorizes how these bodily actions bring forth meaning. In our model, the body is involved in sensemaking not only because people feel and experience the world through their bodily senses, but also because they repeatedly and bodily engage with the world: People use their body to display their feelings; to process tactilely and cognitively while handling objects skillfully (by working hands-on); and to vocally reach their colleagues (by speaking assertively). Hence, in our study, it is not just a "body that feels" that is involved in sensemaking, but a body with a richer repertoire of bodily abilities: a body that feels and displays feelings, tests and processes these feelings, and speaks them. Thus, we theorize the entirety of the embodied sensemaking process (from an initial to a developed sense), and account for the various ways in which the body is involved in sensemaking. In so doing, our paper echoes Patriotta and Spedale's (2009) paper, which shows how non-verbal expressions (e.g., face-to-face interactions, frowning, body posture) influence group sensemaking, as well as Courpasson and Monties' (2017) work, which studies the role of various types of bodily actions (e.g., cleansing rituals, securing with bodies) in meaning construction. Our paper also contributes to the emerging literature on inter-corporeal knowing, i.e., practical knowledge of the dynamic bodies of others (Hindmarsh and Pilnick, 2007: 1414; see also "sensegiving-through-action," Whiteman and Cooper, 2011: 899).

Second, our study advances sensemaking research by theorizing not just the "how" of embodied sensemaking, but also the "what." In other words, we theorize the changing properties of the meaning that people construct with their bodies in order to move forward and overcome resistances when they arise. In the case of intuition, for instance, these properties are detectability, solidity, authority, and commitment. Our study's insights into these properties emerged in part from our close attention to resistances, since it was by attending to resistances that we understood the transformative power of bodily actions. What constitutes the initial sense (intuition) is complex, eludes understanding, and cannot be fully captured by language (Blackman and Sadler-

Smith, 2009; Dane and Pratt, 2007). It is discovered by others and oneself simultaneously, in part thanks to these resistances. Resistances exhort people to clarify and specify their intuition in more detail, and therefore illuminate those aspects of the initial sense that have been unnoticed. When bodily actions meet these demands, by highlighting particular aspects of the initial sense and downplaying others, a more developed sense can be constructed. For instance, in response to resistances from colleagues, working hands-on demonstrates and draws attention to expertise, while downplaying one's inability to explain.

Beyond the specific case of intuition, our paper suggests that resistances are an important element of embodied sensemaking. Because of the ineffability of embodied ways of knowing (e.g., intuition, aesthetic and tacit knowing; see Blackman and Sadler-Smith, 2009; Hadjimichael and Tsoukas, 2019; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2018), making sense with them is likely to trigger resistances, especially in organizational contexts, where disagreements or requests for explanations are commonplace. Resistances, hence, jeopardize the ability to act embodied ways of knowing into sense. But, at the same time, they invite people to refine and manifest further the initial sense that they feel. While the sensemaking literature offers many illustrations of forces emanating from individuals who resist their colleagues' sensemaking efforts, their role in sensemaking processes remains overlooked. In Weick's (1993) Mann Gulch tragedy paper, Dodge's escape fire can be seen as an intuitive gesture (Holt and Cornelissen, 2014; Introna, 2018). His injunction to the firefighters to lie down in the area the escape fire has burned, met resistance from the young firefighters—one of them replied: "To hell with this, I am getting out of here!", and they all ran to the ridge. Our paper offers a first glance at their role, and future research could build upon our insights in order to specify further how they are involved in embodied sensemaking.

Making sense with embodied ways of knowing: Attending to the physicality and materiality of language

Embodied ways of knowing are at the heart of the actions of experts (Benner, 1994; Dreyfus, 2014)—a traditionally cherished population of the sensemaking literature. They are also at the heart of many sensemaking processes (e.g., Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012; Introna, 2018; Sonenshein, 2007; Weick et al., 2005; Weick, 1993), even though they are often edited out from the accounts.

It would be natural to think that making sense with embodied ways of knowing would point to the limits of language in bringing forth meaning. Instead, our study suggests that language continues to play an important role (e.g., speaking assertively), even though individuals may be unable to verbalize the underlying somatic and tacit aspects of their intuitive process (Sadler-Smith, 2008). Importantly, our study directs our attention to the (too often neglected) physicality and materiality of language. We paid attention to the presence of the bodily senses, body, and feelings in language, and to how they affect sensemaking efforts (e.g., strengthening interpersonal affective interaction, drawing attention to some features of sense and downplaying others). We also explained how discourse, and especially spoken discourse, is embedded in multiple activities that engage bodies and materiality (Kuhn et al., 2017), so that materiality constrains or permits the discourse that may be constructed. For instance, "working hands-on"—by manifesting expertise—enables "speaking assertively" to be interpreted as authority and commitment, instead of overconfidence or gratuitous authoritarianism. Our study, hence, suggests that research on embodied sensemaking—when approached from a holistic standpoint—has the potential to enrich sensemaking research by adding complexity and breadth to our understanding of how language participates in embodied sensemaking efforts.

Future research could also draw inspiration from recent developments in communication studies around the materiality of language—see in particular the Constitutive Communication of Organization stream of research (e.g., Cooren, 2018; Cooren et al., 2011; Kuhn et al., 2017). For these scholars, discourse is intrinsically material and embodied; it mutually constitutes relationships between human and non-human agents (Mills and Cooren, 2016). These works, which advocate for a relational turn in communication, could help sensemaking scholars overcome dualisms between e.g., mind and body, or discourse and materiality/body, by providing them with a rich conceptual apparatus.

Implications, limitations and future research

Making sense with embodied ways of knowing in a variety of organizational contexts

The embodied sensemaking model described in our study is grounded in our case but has a form of conceptual coherence that suggests that it might plausibly occur in other circumstances where practitioners often draw on embodied ways of knowing to carry out their tasks. However, given the specific nature of the artistic organizations we studied, it is important to reflect on the

transferability of our findings and model to other settings and suggest possible avenues that can be examined in future research.

One specificity of filmmaking is to be an artistic organization. In contrast to many industries in which rationality is a social norm guiding actions (Cabantous and Gond, 2011), such as banking (Hensman and Sadler-Smith, 2011) or consultancy (Calabretta et al., 2017), people in the film industry are more likely to accept others' intuitions, and to be guided by considerations such as feelings (Bart and Guber, 2002). We might therefore assume that, in this industry, embodied ways of knowing are less likely to encounter strong resistances than in other professional contexts. Even so, the emphasis placed on resistances in our study offers a substantial glimpse of stronger resistances that may arise against embodied sensemaking process in non-artistic organizations.

In healthcare organizations, for instance, doctors, surgeons, and nurses are summoned to provide evidence, justification, and data to substantiate their judgment (Kosowski and Roberts, 2003). We can expect that, in these organizations, making sense with embodied ways of knowing might face important resistances. As a matter of fact, nurses often report having intuitions and struggling to act them into sense (Benner, 1994; Melin-Johansson et al., 2017). Thus, it would be relevant to explore how attempts at making sense with embodied ways of knowing take place in these organizations, and how properties are acquired through the sensemaking process. For instance, Benner's (1994) studies on the development of nurses from novices to experts suggest that manifesting affect, expertise and confidence are key to act intuition into sense when resistances arise—supporting therefore our findings. However, these studies also suggest that it might be possible to manifest the expertise facet of intuition (and acquire solidity) without necessarily handling medical instruments (working hands-on). Nurses could, for instance, demonstrate skills and experience by pointing to past patients cases that show similarities with the problem at hand (see the illustration in Weick et al., 2005).

The 1986 space shuttle Challenger explosion provides an additional illustration of the transferability of our model to other settings. This tragedy has complex causes and requires multilevel explanations (Edmondson, 2003; Vaughan, 1996). However, our model highlights some specific aspects of the disaster. Zooming in on the pre-launch meeting suggests that Roger Boisjoly (booster seal expert) did not follow trajectory #2 and failed to accomplish sensemaking during the meeting. He knew, in a tacit way, that launching under 53 degrees would be dangerous,

but was not able to provide evidence to support his conclusions. He displayed his feeling (e.g., he raised his voice and invoked his bodily senses—the "black and sooty" color he saw "with [his] own eyes"; Edmondson, 2003: 3). He also signaled his confidence in his judgment by speaking assertively at multiple times (e.g., "Launching it below freezing is an act away from goodness", "There's only one right conclusion"; Edmondson, 2003: 2–5). However, Larry Mulloy (NASA solid rocket booster manager) strongly resisted Boisjoly's sensemaking efforts by getting angry, asking multiple questions, and demanding explanations and reliable data to support Boisjoly's conclusions. In this highly political context, Boisjoly struggled to manifest his expertise when confronted to Mulloy—an experienced NASA engineer and manager. As a result, his judgment did not acquire solidity in the eyes of Mulloy—who said that Boisjoly's conclusions were based on a dangerous guess, and that it was unworthy of an engineer to draw conclusions without more robust data.

Beyond providing an illustration of the transferability of our model to other settings, the Challenger case also suggests that, in some contexts, manifesting one's expertise and getting others to recognize it is a political act. Future research could pay closer attention to political and power games, by empirically exploring how manifesting one's expertise, confidence, and affect occur in organizations where political behavior among organizational actors is prevalent (Elbanna, 2006; Elbanna and Child, 2007), and where interpersonal conflicts and hostility among top managers may arise (Eisenhardt et al., 1997). In such organizations, people might fear a loss of credibility if they displayed their intuition through feelings. They might therefore also need to manifest their expertise in other ways. Building on Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model, Sonenshein (2007), for instance, argues that people rely on their intuition to solve ethical issues and have to justify their choice using rationalist terms in order to bolster their (and others') confidence in the decision, and to respond to social expectations about acceptable ways of making decisions. This suggests that in organizational contexts where interpersonal discord or politicking are common, specific actions, including producing rational accounts, might be needed in order for intuition to be acted into sense.

Implications for intuition research and practice

The organizational literature on intuition tends to focus on individual-level intuition. Interestingly, the few scholars who have studied intuition at the collective level (Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2018) have noticed that sharing individual-level intuition requires people to engage in verbal

interpretations and articulations of their intuition (see, e.g., the interpreting stage in Crossan et al., 1999). We extend these works by theorizing the role of language, and pointing to the role of the socio-material environment, as well as bodily interactions among individuals.

Our attempt to study intuition at the collective level, however, has limitations, such as the absence of video recordings of the observations. While our focus was on macro expressions such as gestures, movements, and facial expressions, future research could use video recordings in order capture more micro expressions and behaviors that are too small and rapid to be immediately visible, and that may, therefore, escape our attention (Gylfe et al., 2016).

Finally, this study has implications for practitioners. Our study points to the importance of the body in the communication of intuition—through, for instance, the display of feelings—as well as appropriate modes of verbal and non-verbal communication of intuition and other embodied ways of knowing (e.g., aesthetic knowing; see Stigliani and Ravasi, 2018; Strati, 2003). Our findings therefore suggest that coaching programs aiming at fostering intuition awareness (Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004) could also include modules to help people develop their abilities to learn from, and through, bodily senses (Rigg, 2018), and to communicate their intuition by mobilizing various modes of expression.

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Notes

[1] We will, from now on, use "making sense with intuition" and "acting intuition into sense" interchangeably. From Weick's (2009) perspective, making sense is not only about interpreting, but also about performing actions that create meaning and enact the environment people seek to understand (Weick, 1995), in a circular and simultaneous way. He synchronized sense and action in that eloquent sentence: "[P]eople act their way into sense" (p. 130). Embracing that symbiotic ontology, we do not separate sense and action, nor sensemaking and enactment (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015).

[2] This criterion is rather conservative compared to that used by Baldacchino et al. (2014) and Calabretta et al. (2017)—the only two papers that explain how intuition was identified. These authors retained cases where just one characteristic of intuition was present. However, using only one characteristic (e.g., "quick judgment") is insufficient to precisely identify intuition. For instance, the fact that a judgment is quick is not sufficient to identify it as an intuition, since this characteristic might also denote a guess (Dane and Pratt, 2007) or very rapid act of reasoning (Dane et al., 2012).

[3] Kuhn et al. (2017) follow the becoming of an idea using a socio-material and relational ontology. They explain that relations (among people and their socio-material environment) enable an emerging idea to acquire the properties needed to overcome resistances and be brought into existence. While Kuhn et al. (2017) offer a repertoire of conceptual tools (e.g., relations, resistances, properties), they do not offer a ready-made methodology.

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Tables and figures

Table 1. Intuition identification: Descriptive codes

Characteristics	Illustrative references	Semantic descriptors	Behavioural descriptors	Illustrations from the field
Affectively charged reactions	Dane & Pratt (2007) Hayashi (2001) Sadler-Smith (2016)	Interjections, onomatopoeias, affect related words used in situ, reports of having felt something (during informal interviews)	Enthusiasm, gestures (e.g., applause), vocal changes, facial reactions, looking preoccupied, disoriented	**Example from *The Evil Clone*:** Observation: Sally: "I have a *bad feeling*", "looks *preoccupied*" **[affective charge]**, "*immediate* reaction" **[quick judgment]** Informal interview: "*I felt* that **[affective charge confirmed]** the ropes and the curtains were going to be an issue. . . I didn't know how exactly **[inability to explain]**" **Example from *The Game*:** Observation: Wyatt immediately answers **[quick judgment]**: "I'm not feeling it" **[affective charge]** Informal interview: "I *knew* [emphasized] **[feeling of certainty]** it could be dangerous" **Example from *Small Head*:** Observation: Nathaniel looks preoccupied. He is *stroking his back of the neck and looking around him* **[affective charge].** Informal interview: Nathaniel said *he had the feeling something was wrong* **[affective charge confirmed]** *from the beginning*, when the two actors *started to*
Feeling of certainty and confidence	Dane & Pratt (2007) Dörfler & Ackerman (2012) Gigerenzer (2008)	Words explicitly associated with certitude ("no doubt", "sure") or implicitly ("I felt it strongly", "I knew")	Gestures (clapping hands, rapping on the table, etc.), assertive glance, assured tone of voice, emphasis on words and verbs.	
Quick judgment	Bastick (1982) Burke & Miller (1999) Dörfler & Ackerman (2012) Gigerenzer (2008)	Interjections, words related to speed ("I immediately knew")	Finger snaps, facial reactions	

	Kahneman (2003) Klein (2011)			*play the scene* **[quick judgment]**, but he did not find anything explicitly wrong. He said he just knew. I asked how he knew. Long *silence*. Then he said he was *not able to explain* **[inability to explain]**. **Example from *Summer*:** Observation: Badis *spontaneously* suggests moving a sequence **[quick judgment]** and *suddenly sits up straight on his chair* **[affective charge]**. Fred asks if he is sure. Badis answers that he is, but that he "*can't explain*" **[inability to explain]** Informal interview: He reported a *feeling of certainty* **[feeling of certainty]** and clarity that he *could not explain* **[inability to explain confirmed]**
Inability to explain	Dane & Pratt (2007) Gigerenzer (2008) Simon & Chase (1973)	Words related to ignorance and/or difficulty to explain and/or inability to explain	Difficulties expressing oneself, silences, sighs. Physically searching, glance looking for an explanation, hand on the forehead	

Table 2. Summary table

Intuition (who and what)	Resistance	Sensemaking phases
Intuition acted into sense: Illustrations of Trajectory #1 (no resistance)		
Sally: The configuration of the extras does not work (in the main text)	-	Displaying feelings ➔ Speaking assertively
Nathaniel: The acting does not work (in the main text)	-	
Sally: The shoot/acting is right or wrong (Table 3)	-	
Owen: A line in the script must be changed (Table 3)	-	
Intuition acted into sense: Illustrations of Trajectory #2 (with resistances)		
Jo: She will find a way to fix the rope mechanism (in the main text; vignette 1)	Helen	Displaying feelings ➔ Working hands-on ➔ Speaking assertively
Wyatt: He produced a field of view that fits (Table 4)	Owen	
Jean: A sequence must be reworked (Table 4)	Badis	
Counter-examples of trajectory #1		
Amelia: Nathaniel should stop his quest and should move on, or they would lack time (in the main text)	-	Displaying feelings
Counter-examples of trajectory #2		
Wyatt: The wide-angle Owen wants is dangerous (in	Owen	Displaying feelings ➔ Speaking assertively ➔ Working hands-on*

the main text; vignette 2)		
Owen: A wide angle is needed (in the main text; vignette 2)	Wyatt	Speaking assertively ➔ Displaying feelings* ➔ Speaking assertively ➔ Speaking assertively ➔ Displaying feelings
Sally: The rope mechanism will not be fixed quickly (in the main text; vignette 1)	Helen	Displaying feelings
Badis: A sequence must be kept (Table 5)	Owen	Displaying feelings ➔ Speaking assertively ➔ Speaking assertively
Badis: A sequence must be kept (Table 5)	Fred	

* *When the resistant person is not present*

Table 3. Trajectory #1 (no resistance): Displaying feelings, and speaking assertively

Illustrations	**Analysis**
- Sally is shaking her head: "No, no, it's not okay. [Still shaking her head] We're going to start all over again." - Sally, later, during the shooting of another scene: "[nodding] Okay, we got it! [clapping her hands]" - Sally is talking to an actor during the shooting of a scene: [shaking her head] "No, not like that. Play this scene like that instead." [miming the gesture and expression that she wants]	In these three illustrations, Sally has an intuition. [Obs: presence of an affective charge, clapping her hands, nodding, etc.; immediate reaction when the shoot ends; Informal interview: inability to explain how she knew] Sally acted her intuition into sense very quickly. She first *displayed her feelings* by reacting physically (shaking her head, nodding), then *spoke assertively* through the use of the indicative ("it's not ok", "we got it"), the imperative ("Play this scene like that instead"), and predictions ("We're going to start all over again").
Owen often directs his actors or approves a shot with no hesitation, quickly, and sometimes with an affective charge ("Super!" "Wow!", etc.). We offer a glimpse of these moments below. Following an actor's suggestion to change a dialogue ("Do I add a "Felix"? Like "Felix, how was your interview?"), Owen (the director) immediately replied: "Yes! Good. It sounds good. We change the dialogue. [talking to the script supervisor so that she records it on the shooting script]."	Owen has an intuition. [Obs: presence of an affective charge, enthusiasm, interjection, nodding; fast reaction; Informal interview: inability to explain his judgment, it is just "something [he] can feel"; feeling of certainty, "I know"] He first *displayed his feeling* by vocally reacting (interjection: "Yes!") then he *spoke assertively* by using the indicative ("It sounds good," "We change the dialogue"). His sensemaking effort was not met with any resistance and his intuition was acted into sense smoothly—the change was recorded in shooting script immediately.

Table 4. Trajectory #2 (resistance): Displaying feelings, working hands-on and speaking assertively

Illustrations	Analysis
On the set of *The Game*, as the team is shooting a scene, Owen does not feel comfortable with the initial field of view. He remains silent a short moment, while Wyatt (director of photography) makes a few changes in order to improve the field of view: Owen – Go closer... [Wyatt makes the change] Don't go too close... [Wyatt does this] Not like that... no, no, it's not right, I don't know, it's not right. Wyatt – Ah! Is it better now? It looks right, now, don't you think so? Owen – Nah Wyatt – Why's that? What's wrong? Owen – Err, I don't know, it's just not right, try something else [Wyatt tries something else; he stops for a second, he looks skeptical. He tries something else again]. Wyatt – Oh, there! Look, look, look, here it's perfect, it's exactly what you need. [Wyatt stops moving his camera around, then he frames and shows the scene with gestures] Owen – Ok, excellent, we've got it, let's go.	In this illustration, we can see Wyatt having an intuition. [Obs: presence of an affective charge, enthusiasm, interjections; feeling of certainty, "perfect", "exactly"; Informal interview: "unexplainable automatic feeling", inability to explain how he knew] Wyatt *displayed his feeling* verbally (interjections: "Ah!", "Oh, there!"), *worked hands-on* (by manipulating his camera), and then *spoke assertively* by verbally directing and indicating ("Look, look, look, here it's perfect, it's exactly what you need"). Wyatt's intuition was acted into sense; Owen approved it ("Ok, excellent, we've got it, let's go").

During editing, Fred (producer), Badis (director) and Jean (editor) remain silent. They seem bothered by a sequence: Fred – [silence] There is something wrong… Badis, what do you think? Badis – Obviously, [there is something wrong] but at the same time, this sequence is central, so I can't give up on it. We have already given up on so many important sequences. . . Something doesn't feel right, but it doesn't come from this sequence itself. Jean – I agree, I feel the same, but I can't really put my finger on what's wrong [Jean starts trying some changes on his editing keyboard] Fred – [Jean nods his head] Nice! Badis – Err… I don't know… Jean – Yes, yes, this is exactly what is needed. Now, it works really well, the rhythm is good, now it's fine. . . Badis – Look, if it's how you feel it, I follow you.	Like Badis and Fred, Jean has the intuition that something is not right with the sequence. [Obs: presence of an affective charge, he sighs, then keeps silent, then says that he also feels something is wrong; but he cannot provide an explanation, "I can't really put my finger on what's wrong"; Informal interview: feeling of certainty, he said he clearly knew right away]. He first *displayed his feeling*, mostly verbally ("I feel the same"), then *worked hands-on* by using his editing keyboard and computer to try some changes. When Fred seemed happy with Jean's work, Badis manifested a disagreement and thus resisted Jean's sensemaking efforts. In response to this resistance, Jean *spoke assertively* by using the indicative ("This is exactly what is needed", "it works really well", "the rhythm is good", "It's fine"). As a result, Badis stopped resisting and followed Jean's intuition; Jean acted his intuition into sense.

Table 5. Counter-examples of trajectory #2 (with resistances)

Illustrations	Analysis
During the editing of *Summer*, Jean (editor), Badis (director), and Fred (producer) are working together in the editing room, sitting in front of the main screen. They are watching the rough cut again and making changes. At one point, Badis spontaneously suggests moving a sequence: Badis – [suddenly sits up straight on his chair] We'll put the entrance like this [he mimes] Fred – Are you sure you want to put the entrance like that? Badis – Yes, yes, it will be nice, I can't explain right now, but you'll see. Fred – Err… Are you really sure? Badis – Yeah… Why not? Fred – My first impression is that the entrance of the [swimming pool], behind your [sister], looks like we didn't have the money. In the end, they did not put the entrance where/how Badis wanted.	Here Badis has an intuition. [Obs: quick judgment, spontaneous suggestion; presence of an affective charge, sudden move on his chair; and he "can't explain"; Informal interview: feeling of knowing with certainty; inability to explain how he knew] The illustration shows that Badis *displayed his feeling* by physically reacting (suddenly sits up straight on his chair) and *spoke assertively* by verbally predicting the future ("We'll put the entrance like this"). As Fred resisted Badis' intuition ("Are you sure you want to put the entrance like that?"), Badis insisted and *spoke assertively* again through predictions ("Yes, yes, it will be nice," "you'll see"). Fred pushed back again by implicitly asking Badis to elaborate ("Are you really sure?"). Badis became less convinced and passionate ("Yeah… Why not?"), and did not act his intuition into sense.

At another moment during the editing of *Summer*, Fred (producer) challenged and therefore resisted Badis's intuition, looking for more explanations that Badis could not provide. It was Fred's modus operandi: Badis – [Raising his voice] You're not giving this sequence a chance!! It's obvious, we need to keep it! Fred – Why's that? Badis – Well, clearly, it's obvious, it has to be here. Of course, as it is, well, there's the [guy]…	As in the illustration above, Badis has an intuition about the editing. [Obs: presence of an affective charge, change of tone; quick judgment, he reacted as soon as Fred and Jean expressed doubts about a sequence; Informal interview: immediate and strong feeling of knowing; inability to explain] He *displayed his feeling* by physically reacting (he raises his voice) and *spoke assertively* by indicating ("It's obvious, we need to keep it!"). Fred resisted by asking for explanations ("Why's that?"). Badis responded by *speaking assertively* again ("it's obvious, it has to be here"). He eventually dropped his intuition.

Figure 1. Data structure



Figure 2. Acting intuition into sense: A model



Appendices

Table A1. Observation data

	Small Head	The Evil Clone	The Game	Summer
Director (and experience)	Nathaniel (7 years of experience as a director, 3 years of experience as an assistant producer)	Sally: director, writer, music composer, and head of special effects (First fiction film; many years of experience as a director of music video clips and animated movies. Sally is also an experienced writer, music composer, graphic designer, and illustrator)	Owen: director and editor (15 years of experience in the film industry, mostly as a director, but also as an actor, production assistant, camera operator, etc.)	Badis (First feature film; but more than 10 years of experience as an actor; and some experience of directing with 4 short films)
Type of film / budget	Fiction, Short film Small budget production	Mid-length film High budget production	Funny educational web series Small budget production	Fiction, Long film – this film features three famous actors High budget film

What is observed	Shooting	Shooting	Shooting	Editing (including watching the “rough cut” with the producer, editor, director, assistant producers, and some of Badis’ friends)
Professional recognition	27 selections for festivals 15 awards won	More than 100 selections for festivals 13 awards won	There is no festival for this type of film	1 selection at a famous international film festival

Table A2. Representative data from field notes

2nd order themes	1st order concepts	Additional data from field notes
Reacting physically	Whole-body movements	"Sally suddenly freezes"
		"Sally steps backwards and is thinking"
		"Fred nearly jumps out of his chair"
		"Owen is smiling while watching the actors playing. He seems pretty sure to have the "right [shot]," it seems difficult for him not to move or to talk before the end of the shot. He looks ready to jump. . . He comes just behind Wyatt, he is pressing his body against Wyatt in order to see the image on the monitor directly, as close as possible. His mouth is even pressed against Wyatt's shoulder"
	Hand/arm gestures	"Amelia and Nathaniel applaud and laugh"
		"Owen applauds"
		"Wyatt suddenly taps on Owen's shoulder"
	Facial expressions	"Wyatt is watching the shot, alternating between his monitor and the set; while they are shooting, he is nodding a lot. It seems to mean: 'Super'"
		"Badis, Jean, and Fred are all nodding their heads, at the same time, with enthusiasm"
		"Charles looks at the monitor, he looks bothered, he's frowning"
		"Charles and Nathaniel are laughing when they see the result of a shot"
Reacting vocally	Onomatopoeias	"Oh my! This one is really good! Ooh!" (Wyatt)
		"Wow!" (Owen, Nathaniel, Amelia)
	Interjections	"Great!" (Nathaniel)
		"Excellent! We'll keep it!" (Owen)
		"The best of the best, isn't it?!" (Amelia)
		"Ah!" "Super!" (Owen)
	Silences	"[silence] There is something wrong… Badis, what do you think?" (Fred)
		"[silence] Err… Are you sure?" (Sally)

Verbally reporting feelings	Verbalizing a bad feeling	"I am not feeling it" (Badis)
		"My feeling is that it will ring false. I don't have a very good feeling about it, we should just try to play it differently" (Nathaniel)
		"There is a rhythm issue with a sequence. Jean: 'There is something that makes me uncomfortable . . .'"
	Verbalizing a good feeling	"I have a good feeling about it, you'll see" (Fred)
		"Badis: 'My feeling on this sequence, with this music, is very, very good.' He puts the music on his phone so that we can hear the match, then says: 'What do you say? It rocks, doesn't it? I've got a good feeling, the vibes match'"

Table A2 Cont'd. Representative data from field notes

2nd order themes	1st order concepts	Additional data from field notes
Using working tools to solve a problem	Typing	"For Jean, there is a rhythm issue with a sequence: "There is something that makes me uncomfortable." He starts clicking and typing on his keyboard without saying anything, he is changing things. . . . He says: "I'm shortening this sequence". He looks like he is satisfied, he stops doing anything. Badis and Fred: "Yes, OK""
	Manipulating materials	"Jo is handling her tools and the rope mechanism. She is cutting, rearranging, and pulling the ropes, tying small knots"
	Moving equipment	"Continuity issue. A cloud is hiding the sun. They have to reproduce, with their lights, the same luminosity as before. Wyatt moves his lighting equipment, tries multiple orientations and locations."
Using working tools to create	Using a device	"Next sequence. We were watching, the sequence was not over, and Badis looks like he suddenly had an idea: "Ah!" He googled something, played a musical piece [again] so that we can listen to it while watching the sequence . . ." N.B: At the moment, there is no music in the movie. This is something that will be done later in the postproduction process, but Badis has some ideas about music they could use that occur to him while he is watching"
	Clicking	"Jean is clicking and typing on his keyboard. He seems to be moving things around (I see many micro images scrolling on his screen). While continuing what he is doing, he says: "And… [he finishes what he was doing] here it is, it's better"
	Showing how to use equipment	"Wyatt is showing Owen how to use a handheld camera. He takes the camera and moves with it, then he shows the result. . . He explains what is the intended effect. . ."
Verbally predicting	Use of the future tense (affirmative)	"It will work" (Badis) "Let's start from scratch, it'll be super this time!" (Sally) "For me, my feeling is that it's going to be super nice on one condition: on the reverse shot, it would be good to see the cigarette with the red embers starting" (Nathaniel)

	Use of the future tense (negative)	"I won't be able to do it" (Wyatt) "It won't work" (Charles)
Verbally indicating	Use of the indicative to approve	"This one is very, very good! It is perfect!" (Owen) "Good, very good, but we duplicate it" (Owen) "Cut! This one is good for me, let's move on" (Owen) "Ok, we've got it" (Nathaniel)
	Use of indicative to disapprove	"Sally is shaking her head: "No, no, it's not ok" [Still shaking her head]. We're going to start all over again."
Verbally directing	Use of the imperative (affirmative)	"Pick up [the phone] with the other hand" (Owen) "Put your hand like that . . . Put your hand out now, a little bit" (Owen) "No, play it like that [she mimes] instead" (Sally)